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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court's jurisdiction rests upon Utah Code Ann. sec. 78A-3-102(3)(a). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
ISSUE 1: Whether the court of appeals erred in its application of relevant precedent 
to the facts of this case. 
Standard of Review: On certiorari, the Utah Supreme Court reviews 
the decision of the Utah Court of Appeals, not the decision of the 
trial court. Sill v. Hart, 2007 UT 45, If 5, 162 P.3d 1099, 1102. This 
Court gives the court of appeals' "conclusions of law no deference." 
Bluemel v. Utah, 2007 UT 90, f 9, 173 P.3d 842. 
ISSUE 2: Whether the court of appeals erred in declining to consider Petitioner's 
discussion of Lovelandv. Orem City Corp., 746 P.2d 763 (Utah 1987), and 
Smith v. Frandsen, 94 P.3d 919 (Utah 2001), in their reply brief on appeal 
and in treating similar contentions as not being raised in their initial brief. 
Standard of Review: On certiorari, the Utah Supreme Court reviews 
the decision of the Utah Court of Appeals, not the decision of the 
trial court. Sill v. Hart, 2007 UT 45, If 5, 162 P.3d 1099, 1102. This 
Court gives the court of appeals' "conclusions of law no deference." 
Bluemel v. Utah, 2007 UT 90, \ 9, 173 P.3d 842. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, ETC. 
None. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Plaintiffs/Petitioners David and Kristine Anderson filed suit against 
Defendant/Respondent Matthew Kriser on April 5, 2007. (R. at 1-39.) The Andersons 
alleged a single cause of action of fraudulent non-disclosure against Kriser. (R. at 3-4.) 
The Andersons argued that Kriser sold them a residential lot with collapsible soils, that 
Kriser knew about a geotechnical report that contained information about the collapsible 
soils, but that Kriser failed to disclose the existence or contents of that report to the 
Andersons. (R. at 1-39.) 
On May 15, 2008, Kriser moved for summary judgment, arguing he did not know 
about the existence or contents of the geotechnical report and that he did not know the 
property had collapsible soils. (R. at 90-159.) The Andersons timely opposed the motion 
(r. at 195-244), and Kriser timely filed a reply memorandum (r. at 246-301). 
On September 22, 2008, the trial court heard oral argument on Kriser's motion. 
(R. at 306-07.) A few weeks later, on October 8, 2008, the court issued an ephemeral 
written decision granting Kriser's summary judgment motion on one ground: that 
although the Andersons alleged fraudulent non-disclosure against Kriser for failing "to 
disclose the presence of collapsible soils that made the real property unsuitable for the 
construction of a residence," the Andersons "failed to provide any evidence that Matthew 
Kriser knew that the real property in question had collapsible soils unsuitable for the 
construction of a residence." (R. at 323-24.) 
The Andersons filed their Notice of Appeal on November 6, 2008. (R. at 344-46.) 
The Utah Court of Appeals took the case, and without oral argument, it issued a 
memorandum decision on November 5, 2009 affirming the trial court's grant of summary 
judgment in favor Kriser. Anderson v. Kriser, 2009 UT App 319, f^ 1. (A copy of the 
court of appeals' opinion is attached hereto as Addendum A.) 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Earthtec Engineering Conducts a Geotechnical Analysis 
of the Aspen Cove Subdivision in December 1997 
On December 2, 1997, Earthtec Engineering, P.C. issued a report containing the 
results of a geotechnical analysis that Earthtec had conducted on the Aspen Cove 
Subdivision ("Subdivision") in Pleasant Grove, Utah ("Geotech Report"). (R. at 217.) 
Earthtec prepared the Geotech Report for Mr. Drew Kriser, a relative of 
Defendant/Respondent Matthew Kriser. (R. at 217.) 
Earthtec's Geotech Report contained many observations, warnings, and 
recommendations that should have been followed before beginning residential 
construction in the Subdivision. For example, the Geotech Report made the following 
observations and warnings: 
• "the soil profile varied across the [Subdivision]" (r. at 218); 
• "the clays on the site were found to be soft and slightly collapsible when wetted" 
(r. at 218, 221,223); 
• "[p]roPer drainage is important to the performance of the footings for [the 
structures that will be built]"(r. at 219); 
3 
• "[w]etting of the foundation soils may cause some degree of volume change 
within the soil and should be prevented both during and after construction" (r. at 
224). 
In addition to these observations, the Geotech Report also warned to over-excavate 
the footings, replace native soil with structural fill, and to keep water away from the 
footings and foundations of the structures. Specifically, the report made the following 
recommendations: 
• "[w]e recommend footings be extended into the dense native gravels or supported 
on a minimum of 12 inches of structural fill for a bearing capacity of 1500 psf' (r. 
at 218); 
• "[tjopsoil, man-made fill, or soils loosened by construction activities should be 
removed from the building pad and pavement areas prior to foundation 
excavations and site grading fills" (r. at 221); 
• "[foundations should be excavated down to the dense, sandy gravels or, if in silts 
or clays, at least 12inches [sic] beyond the bottom footings" (r. at 221); 
• "[s]oft spots identified during proof rolling should be excavated and replaced with 
structural fill" (r. at 221); 
• "we recommend spread footings be supported on structural fill or extended into 
the dense native gravels" (r. at 223); 
• "[foundations should not be partially supported on structural fill and partially on 
native soils.. . . [I]f structural fill is needed under any portion of the structure, then 
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a minimum of 12 inches of structural fill should exist below the entire foundation" 
(r. at 223); 
• "[g]round surface should be graded to drain away from the structures in all 
directions" (r. at 224); 
• "[rjoof runoff should be collected in rain gutters with downspouts designed to 
discharge well outside of the backfill limits" (r. at 225); 
• "[s]prinkler heads.. . should be aimed away from foundation walls" (r. at 225); 
• "[o]ther precautions which may become evident during design and construction 
should be taken" (r. at 225). 
Kriser Knows a Geotechnical Study Is Completed for the Subdivision 
Kriser testified in his deposition that he knew Pleasant Grove City required a 
geotechnical study before the streets could be put in. (R. at 202; Kriser Dep. 19:20-21.) 
He went even further and clarified that he "knew that [a geotechnical report] had to be 
done before [Pleasant Grove City] would allow us to develop [the Subdivision]." (R. at 
202; Kriser Dep. 19:21-23.) 
Thus, by the time Kriser was selling lots—and by his own admission—he knew a 
geotechnical report had been completed. And as a seller and/or developer of real 
property, he is charged (at minimum) with knowledge of the existence of the Geotech 
Report. And more importantly, he has a legal duty to inform the Andersons of the report. 
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The Andersons Purchase a Lot from Kriser (a Developer) 
in April 1998—Four Months After the Earthtec Geotech Report—but 
Kriser Does Disclose the Existence or Contents of the Report 
In 1998, the Andersons approached Kriser to inquire about purchasing a lot in the 
Aspen Cove "A" development in Pleasant Grove, Utah. (R. at 2, 199.) On April 30, 
1998, the Andersons signed a one-page document, titled "Offer to Purchase" ("Offer"), to 
buy lot number two in the development ("Property"). (R. at 2, 199.) The Offer included 
a description of the Property and stated the purchase price. (R. at 199.) 
Before purchasing the home, Kriser did not inform the Andersons about the 
existence or contents of the Geotech Report. (R. at 199.) Moreover, the Andersons did 
not discover the existence or contents of the Geotech Report for themselves or from any 
other party. (R. at 199.) 
Ultimately, the Andersons closed on their purchase on or about June 1, 1998. (R. 
at 2.) 
Shortly After Moving in, 
the Andersons Discover Problems with Their New Home 
After moving in, the Andersons discovered various unsuitable conditions related 
to the underlying ground and soil beneath and surrounding their home. (R. at 2.) The 
soil conditions resulted in significant damage to the Andersons' home, including but not 
limited to settling in and around the home, cracking around windows, exterior cladding, 
and cracking in concrete walls and in the basement slab. (R. at 2.) 
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Kriser Visits the Andersons After they Filed Suit 
After the Andersons filed this law suit, Kriser visited their home. (R. at 199.) 
Among other things, Kriser told the Andersons that he saw in the 1997 Earthtec Geotech 
Report that Earthtec had dug a test pit directly in front of the Andersons' home. (R. at 
199-200.) Kriser also implied that he made a mistake by not disclosing the Earthtec 
Geotech Report and by failing to follow its recommendations, saying, "We were a young 
company at the time we did this development." (R. at 200.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The Utah Court of Appeals' mistakenly analogized the facts from Smith to this 
case. The court erred in concluding that, because the developer in Smith was not liable to 
the homeowner, the developer in this case (Kriser) is not liable to the homeowner (the 
Andersons). 
But that over-simplifies Smith and this case and ignores dispositive distinctions 
between the two cases. In Smith, the developer did not sell the lot to the homeowner; it 
sold the lot to another builder-contractor, who in turn sold the lot to the homebuyer. 
Thus, the developer was not liable to the homeowner because he was not in privity with 
the homeowner; the homeowner was not the developer's immediate transferee. In 
contrast, in this case, the developer sold the lot directly to the homeowner. Thus, under 
Smith (and Loveland and Yazd), the developer is liable for failing to disclose the Geotech 
Report. 
Next, the court of appeals erred by concluding that the Andersons' failed to raise 
arguments in their opening brief, and therefore, waived them on appeal. Contrary to the 
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court's understanding, the Andersons5 simply elected to use principles of law from the 
most recent case espousing those principles (Yazd) rather than prior cases that also quoted 
the same language (Smith and Loveland). Therefore, the Andersons did not waive any 
arguments on appeal by choosing to use this Court's most recent endorsements of a 
developer's duty rather than the cases that came before it. 
ARGUMENT 
L THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS' OPINION CONTRADICTS THIS 
COURT'S HOLDINGS FROM LOVELAND\ SMITH, AND YAZD THAT A 
DEVELOPER OWES A DUTY OF DISCLOSURE TO HIS PURCHASERS. 
The court of appeals misunderstood and misapplied this Court's precedents 
regarding a developer's (as opposed to a builder's) duty when selling land on which a 
residence will be built. Specifically, the opinion of the court of appeals contradicts with 
this Court's holdings in Loveland, Smith, and Yazd. Therefore, the Court should correct 
the errors by reversing the court of appeals and remanding this matter to the trial court. 
In this case, the appellate court affirmed the grant of summary judgment for Kriser 
on the basis that ICriser was not the "builder-contractor" and, therefore, was not liable for 
the settling and other damage to the Andersons' home. Specifically, the court of appeals 
held that "[i]t is clear from Smith v. Frandsen, 2004 UT 55, 94 P.3d 919, that ultimate 
responsibility for the settling and other damage to the Andersons' house lies with the 
builder-contractor who actually constructed it" Anderson, 2009 UT App 319, \ 6 
(emphasis added). 
The court of appeals' decision is premised on this Court's opinion in Smith, 
focusing on paragraphs 14 to 27 from that case. Summarizing, in Smith, this Court found 
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that a developer did not owe a duty to a homeowner because the developer first sold the 
lot to an intermediary contractor who then sold the lot to the homeowner. Smith, 2004 
UT 55, Yi 14-27. The court of appeals misunderstood the law in Smith, applied that 
misconception to this case, rendering the court of appeals' opinion in Anderson in direct 
conflict with decisions of this Court in Loveland, Smith, and Yazd. 
In Smith, this Court held that "a developer . . . has a duty to exercise reasonable 
care to insure that the . . . lots are suitable for construction . . . and he must disclose to his 
purchaser any condition which he knows or reasonably ought to know makes the 
subdivided lots unsuitable for such residential building." Id. ^16 (citing Lovelandv. 
Orem City Corp., 746 P.2d 763, 769 (Utah 1987) (emphases added)). The Court also 
expressly stated that a developer carries a duty of care and disclosure to its immediate 
transferees. Id. ^ 28. 
Under the facts in Smith, the developer did not owe a duty to the homeowner 
because the developer did not sell the lot to the homeowner, but rather, sold the lot a 
"builder-contractor," who in turn, sold the home to the Smiths. Id. ffij 14-27. In that case, 
the court placed the ultimate responsibility of disclosure on the contractor in privity with 
the Smiths—not with the developer—because the developer conveyed the lot directly to 
the contractor (who had knowledge and expertise, and adequate time and opportunity, to 
discover the defects and who, in turn, conveyed the property to the homeowner). Id. ^ 
21. The developer, the Court held, was not liable to "remote purchasers" of the property, 
e.g., the homeowner. Id. Hence, the Court's holding in Smith was that the ultimate 
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responsibility for the settling and other damage lay with the party in privity with the 
homeowner, which in Smith was the contractor. These are not the facts in this case. 
In this case, the Andersons purchased a home directly from Kriser, the developer. 
No intermediary contractor or other party interrupted the conveyance from developer to 
homeowner. The Andersons and Kriser were in privity. Consequently, under Loveland, 
Smith, and Yazd, Kriser had a "duty to exercise reasonable care to insure that the 
subdivided lots are suitable for construction of some type of ordinary, average dwelling 
house and he must disclose to his purchaser any condition which he knows or 
reasonably ought to know makes the subdivided lots unsuitable for such residential 
building'' Loveland, 746 P.2d at 769 (emphasis added) (reaffirmed and quoted in Smith 
and Yazdv. Woodside Homes Corp,, 2006 UT 47, 143 P.3d 283). Kriser's failure to 
disclose the Geotech Report makes him liable under Loveland, Smith, and Yazd for the 
settling problems and the resulting damage that occurred. 
The court of appeals mistakenly analogized the facts in Smith to this case when it 
affirmed the trial court's grant of summary judgment. Under the reasoning in Smith (as 
established in Loveland and reaffirmed in Yazd), the developer's duty is not eliminated 
where the homeowner purchased the lot directly from the developer. And the court of 
appeals erred by concluding that "ultimate responsibility for the settling and other 
damage to the Andersons' home lies with the builder-contractor who actually constructed 
it." Anderson, 2009 UT App 319, f^ 6. A developer is not relieved of liability simply 
because a different builder-contractor builds the home. That sentiment directly 
contradicts Loveland, Smith, and Yazd. A developer's "duty of care and disclosure 
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extendfs]... to its immediate transferees," Smith, 2004 UT 55, ^  28, including the 
homeowner. Indeed, no transferee is more immediate than a homeowner who purchased 
a lot directly from a developer. And that is precisely the case here. 
Because the court of appeals mistakenly applied Smith in affirming the trial 
court's grant of summary judgment to Kriser, the Court should reverse and remand. 
IL THE COURT OF APPEALS MISTAKENLY CONCLUDED THAT THE 
ANDERSONS FAILED TO RAISE CERTAIN CASES AND/OR 
ARGUMENTS IN THEIR OPPOSITION TO KRISER'S SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT AND IN THE ANDERSONS' OPENING BRIEF. 
Next, the court of appeals errs in concluding that the Andersons did not present 
authority for the proposition that "Kriser's alleged knowledge of the existence of the 
[Geotech] Report placed him on notice of its contents." Anderson, 2009 UT App 319, f 
The court's statement is wrong on for two reasons. 
First, the statement of law is incorrect (a developer does not need to have "actual 
contents" of a geotechnical report before being liable for failing to disclose its existence 
to a buyer when the developer is in privity with the buyer). Second, the Andersons did 
1
 Similarly, in paragraph 6 of its opinion, the court of appeals similarly states that 
"[b]ecause Kriser did not construct the Andersons' home, Yazd neither imposes a duty 
nor imputes any knowledge to Kriser. Accordingly, Yazd does not require us to disturb 
the district court's summary judgment ruling." Anderson, 2009 UT App 319, ^ 6 
(footnote omitted). 
The court of appeals missed the point. The Andersons cited Yazd for the principle 
of law that a developer has certain duties, taken from and consistent with this Court's 
holdings in Smith and Loveland. The Andersons were not arguing that Yazd is factually 
identical and therefore universally applicable to this case, which is what the court of 
appeals seemed to conclude. Rather, the Andersons were taking a principle of law 
concerning a developer's duty from the Yazd case (which was quoted in Smith and which 
originated in Loveland) and applying it to Kriser, the developer in this case. 
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present authority below for this proposition, but they simply quoted the more recent cases 
of Smith and Yazd, both of which quote and cite that principal from Loveland with 
approval and support. 
The court of appeals erred by contradicting and misconstruing this Court's 
precedents and by misunderstanding the Andersons' application of a statement of law 
concerning a developer's duty. 
A. A Developer Does Not Have To Have "Actual Knowledge" of the Contents 
of a Geotechnical Report for Liability to Attach. 
Speaking to the first point, the court of appeals was mistaken in concluding that a 
developer must have "actual knowledge" of the contents of a geotechnical report in order 
to be liable under Loveland, Smith, and Yazd. As laid out in Section I supra, this Court 
first promulgated a developer's duty in Loveland, but the Court has reiterated and 
reaffirmed it in both Smith and Yazd: 
a developer . . . has a duty to exercise reasonable care to insure that the . . . 
lots are suitable for construction . . . and he must disclose to his purchaser 
any condition which he knows or reasonably ought to know makes the 
subdivided lots unsuitable for such residential building. 
Smith v. Frandsen, 2004 UT 55, \ 16 (quoting Loveland, 746 P.2d at 769) (emphases 
added); also quoted verbatim with approval in Yazd. 
As discussed in Section I supra, this case is factually distinguishable from Smith. 
In Smith, the developer was not liable because the developer did not sell the property to 
the homebuyer; they were not in privity. Rather, the developer sold the property to a 
builder-contractor, who in turn contracted with the homebuyer to sell the lot and 
construct a home. The builder-contractor, as the party in a superior position to discover 
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the defect and as the party in privity with the homebuyer, cut off liability to the 
developer. 
More to the point, the court of appeals mistakenly concluded that a developer must 
have "actual knowledge" of a geotechnical report before liability attaches. Anderson, 
2009 UT App 319, fflf 4-5. This creates a new standard, and more importantly, 
contradicts this Court's precedents. Plainly, the court of appeals is incorrect. 
In Loveland—and then repeated in Smith and Yazd—this Court has declared and 
restated that a developer has a duty to ensure that lots are suitable for construction of a 
residence and that the "developer . . . must disclose to his purchaser [i.e., the party in 
privity, in this case, the Andersons] any condition which he knows or reasonably ought 
to know makes the subdivided lots unsuitable for such residential building." Smith, 2004 
UT 55 f 16 (citing Loveland) (emphases added). According to this Court, a developer— 
including Kriser—"ought to know" about soil conditions because home construction 
requires a high degree of skill, knowledge, and expertise, "including knowledge of soil 
conditions." Yazd, 2006 UT 47, f^ 24. And the disparity in that skill and knowledge 
between a home buyer and a developer leads to the buyer relying on the expertise of the 
developer. Id. 
Therefore, even if Kriser did not have "actual knowledge" of the contents of the 
Geotech Report, as a developer, he ought to have known about it and ought to have 
disclosed it to the Andersons, according to Yazd. 
2
 Any other result would be absurd. For example, if the Court were to adopt 
Kriser's (or the court of appeals') argument, then a developer like Kriser could get a 
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R The Andersons Raised the "Developer's Duty" Argument in Their 
Opposition to Kriser's Motion for Summary Judgment and in their Opening 
Brief. 
The court of appeals' second error lies in concluding that the Andersons "asserted 
below—without supporting authority—only that Kriser's alleged knowledge of the 
existence of the [Geotech] report placed him on notice of its contents." Anderson, 2009 
UT App 3195 Tj 5 (footnote omitted) (emphasis added). 
Contrary to the court of appeals' statement, the Andersons quoted the statement of 
a developer's duty in its opposition to Kriser's Motion for Summary Judgment. But the 
citation was to Yazd, which was quoting and citing Smith, which was quoting and citing 
Loveland. The Andersons simply chose to cite the most recent Utah Supreme Court 
case—Yazd—because it was the most recent statement and adoption of a developer's 
duty as promulgated by this Court. And in Yazd, this Court was merely reiterating and 
quoting with approbation the statement of law from Smith and Loveland concerning a 
developer's duty. That does not change the fact that the principle of law for which it 
stands—that a developer has a duty to disclose to the purchase any condition he 
reasonably ought to know makes the land unsuitable for building—remains the same. 
geotechnical report but never read it, never have "actual knowledge" of its contents, and 
therefore, escape liability for soil conditions on the land. Surely the law does not reward 
such ignorance, and that cannot be what this Court intended or meant to imply in 
Loveland, Smith, or Yazd. 
In the criminal context, courts sometimes give juries a "willful blindness" 
instruction if a "defendant deliberately closed his eyes to what otherwise would have 
been obvious to him." United States v. Leahy, 445 F.3d 634, 652 (3d Cir. 2006). Such 
an instruction informs jurors "that they may impose criminal liability on people who, 
recognizing the likelihood of wrongdoing, nonetheless consciously refuse to take 
investigatory steps." United States v. Azubike, 564 F.3d 59, 66 (1st Cir. 2009). 
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Similarly, in the Anderson's opening appellate brief in the court of appeals, they 
adopted the same strategy. They cited to Yazd for this statement of law because Yazd was 
the most recent case that quoted this principle of a developer's duty. Yazd quoted it with 
approval, which again is why the Andersons chose to cite Yazd rather than Smith or 
Loveland. It simply is not that case that when a party cites a case for a discrete principle 
of law, that party is adopting the entire cited case as apropos and applicable to the instant 
case. 
Since Loveland, this Court has restated a developer's duty with approbation in 
both Smith and Yazd. In their brief, the Andersons cited the most recent case, Yazd, as 
supportive of this discrete principle of law. The Andersons were not trying to analogize 
the facts from Yazd; they were merely taking a statement of law from that case and 
applying it to this case. The court of appeals seems to have misunderstood, so it 
mistakenly concluded that the Andersons did not raise this argument in their opposition 
to Kriser's Motion for Summary Judgment or in the Andersons' opening brief. 
IIL THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRONEOUSLY EXCLUDED ARGUMENTS 
THAT THE ANDERSONS RAISED IN THEIR REPLY BRIEF, 
Last, in footnote three of its opinion, the court of appeals stated that u[t]he 
Andersons argue for the first time in their reply brief that Loveland. . . and Smith . . . 
impose upon developers '"a duty to exercise reasonable care to [e]nsure that the 
subdivided lots are suitable for construction of some type of ordinary, average dwelling 
house . . . . ' " Anderson, 2009 UT App 319, ^ 6 n.3 (second alteration in original). The 
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court then wrote that because the Andersons raised this argument for the first time in their 
reply brief, the argument would not be considered. Id 
As explained in Section II supra, the court of appeals is incorrect. The principle 
of law cited—and even quoted—by the court of appeals in footnote three is the exact 
(and actually only a portion) of that exact quote in the Andersons' opening brief and in 
their reply brief. But as explained supra, the Andersons elected to take the quote from 
the Yazd case rather from the Smith or Loveland cases because Yazd was this Court's 
most recent interpretation and explanation of a developer's duty to a buyer with whom 
the developer is in privily. Regardless of which case a party cites, the principle of law 
remains the same. Which case the Andersons chose to cite for that principle of law 
should be irrelevant as to whether the principle of law applies in a given case. 
In addition, the court of appeals also seemed to find a distinction between the 
terms used by the parties ("builder-developer") and used by this Court in its cases 
("builder-contractor" and "developer"). This confusion cannot be the basis for denying 
the Andersons' claims. The Andersons used the term "builder-developer" in their 
opening brief because Kriser admitted in his deposition that he was a "developer," which 
is sine qua non of the Andersons' case for fraudulent non-disclosure to establish that 
Kriser had a developer's duties as established in Loveland and reiterated in Smith and 
Yazd. 
3
 Kriser used the term "builder-developer" in referring to himself in his deposition. 
He admitted that his "current occupation" was as a "builder-developer." (R. at 204; 
Kriser Dep. 4:16-17.) 
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Therefore, to show that, by his own admission, he was a developer, the 
Andersons' used the term "builder-developer." There has never been any confusion or 
disagreement that Kriser was not the builder or contractor on the home. Yet the court of 
appeals seems to hinge new legal meaning on the Andersons' use of the term in their 
opening brief and uses it, in part, to affirm the trial court's grant of summary judgment to 
Kriser. It seems it is simply a matter of miscommunication and misunderstanding. 
Therefore, the Andersons did not raise the argument of a developer's duty for the 
first time in their reply brief. They raised it and quoted it verbatim in their opposition to 
Kriser's Motion for Summary Judgment (pp. 9-10) and in their opening brief (pp. 11-13). 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should reverse the court of appeals and 
remand to the trial court. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 9th day of April 2010. 
HILL, JOHNSON & SCHMUTZ, L.C. 
Stephen Quesenberry 
Charles L. Perschon 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs/Petitioners 
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Anderson v. Kriser, 2010 Utah LEXIS 30 (Utah, Feb. 25, 
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Fourth District, Provo Department, 070401158. The 
Honorable Samuel D. McVey. 
CASE SUMMARY: 
PROCEDURAL POSTURE: Plaintiff buyers brought a 
fraudulent concealment claim against defendant seller. 
The Fourth District, Provo Department (Utah), granted 
summary judgment in favor of the seller. 
OVERVIEW: The buyers based the fraudulent con-
cealment claim on the seller's alleged knowledge and 
nondisclosure of a 1997 soils report. The summary 
judgment order dismissed the fraudulent concealment 
claim because the buyers failed to provide evidence that 
the seller knew about collapsible soils on the bare resi-
dential lot. On appeal, the buyers argued that (1) there 
was evidence that the seller had actual knowledge of the 
contents of the report, and (2) knowledge of the presence 
of the collapsible soils was imputed to the seller as a 
builder-developer. The appellate court disagreed that the 
buyers presented evidence that the seller actually knew 
the contents of the report. The evidence was insufficient 
to prevent summary judgment on the issue of the seller's 
actual knowledge of the contents of the report. Further, 
the seller's knowledge of the report and its contents after 
the buyers initiated this lawsuit did nothing to establish 
the seller's knowledge at the time of the sale because the 
report was attached to the buyers' complaint as an exhi-
bit. Also, the seller did not construct the home and was 
not in a builder-contractor relationship with the buyers. 
OUTCOME: The appellate court affirmed the trial 
court's judgment. 
CORE TERMS: soil, summary judgment, collapsible, 
developer, fraudulent concealment, actual knowledge, 
builder-contractor, quotation marks omitted, nondis-
closed, imputed, testing, matter of law, provide evidence, 
soils report, legal duty, nonmoving party, genuine issue, 
material fact, failing to disclose, reply brief, build-
er-developer, subdivided, construct, prevail, lawsuit, 
cutting, disturb, waived, residential, housing 
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Civil Procedure > Summary Judgment > Appellate Re-
view > Standards of Review 
Civil Procedure > Summary Judgment > Standards > 
Appropriateness 
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Civil Procedure > Summary Judgment > Standards > 
Genuine Disputes 
Civil Procedure > Summary Judgment > Standards > 
Materiality 
Evidence > Inferences & Presumptions > Inferences 
[HN1] An appellate court reviews a trial court's legal 
conclusions and ultimate grant or denial of summary 
judgment for correctness and views the facts and all rea-
sonable inferences drawn therefrom in the light most 
favorable to the nonmoving party. Once the moving par-
ty challenges an element of the nonmoving party's case 
on the basis that no genuine issue of material fact exists, 
the burden then shifts to the nonmoving party to present 
evidence that is sufficient to establish a genuine issue of 
material fact. 
Torts > Business Torts > Fraud & Misrepresentation > 
Nondisclosure > Elements 
[HN2] In order to prevail on a claim of fraudulent con-
cealment, a plaintiff must prove (1) that the nondisclosed 
information is material, (2) that the nondisclosed infor-
mation is known to the party failing to disclose, and (3) 
that there is a legal duty to communicate. 
COUNSEL: Stephen Quesenberry and Charles L. Per-
schon, Provo, for Appellants. 
Robert L. Jeffs and Randall L. Jeffs, Provo, for Appellee. 
JUDGES: William A. Thome Jr., Judge. WE CONCUR: 
Gregory K. Orme, Judge, Carolyn B. McHugh, Judge. 
OPINION BY: William A. Thome Jr. 
OPINION 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
THORNE, Judge: 
David and Kristine Anderson appeal from the dis-
trict court's order granting summary judgment in favor of 
Matthew Kriser. The summary judgment order dismissed 
the Andersons' fraudulent concealment claim because the 
Andersons failed to provide evidence that Kriser knew 
about collapsible soils on a bare residential lot (the prop-
erty) sold by Kriser to the Andersons.l We affirm. 
1 Although there is some dispute as to whether 
Kriser sold the property to the Andersons as an 
individual developer or as an agent for Country 
Living Development, LLC, we treat Kriser as the 
seller and developer for purposes of this appeal. 
[HN1] "An appellate court reviews a trial court's le-
gal conclusions and ultimate grant or denial of summary 
judgment for correctness and views the facts and all rea-
sonable inferences drawn therefrom in the light most 
favorable to the nonmoving [*2] party." Orvis v. John-
son, 2008 UT 2, P 6, 177 P.3d 600 (internal quotation 
marks omitted). "[0]nce the moving party challenges an 
element of the nonmoving party's case on the basis that 
no genuine issue of material fact exists, the burden then 
shifts to the nonmoving party to present evidence that is 
sufficient to establish a genuine issue of material fact." 
Waddoups v. Amalgamated Sugar Co., 2002 UT 69, P 
31, 54F\3d 1054. 
The Andersons base their fraudulent concealment 
claim on Kriser's alleged knowledge and nondisclosure 
of a 1997 soils report (the report) that revealed collapsi-
ble soils on the property. [HN2] "In order to prevail on a 
claim of fraudulent concealment, a plaintiff must prove 
(1) that the nondisclosed information is material, (2) that 
the nondisclosed information is known to the party fail-
ing to disclose, and (3) that there is a legal duty to com-
municate." Yazdv. Woodside Homes Corp., 2006 UT 47, 
P 10, 143 P.3d 283 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
The district court granted summary judgment in favor of 
Kriser, concluding that the Andersons failed to provide 
evidence that Kriser knew about the report and the col-
lapsible soils. On appeal, the Andersons argue that (1) 
there [*3] is evidence that Kriser had actual knowledge 
of the contents of the report and (2) knowledge of the 
presence of the collapsible soils was imputed to him as a 
builder-developer. 
We disagree that the Andersons presented evidence 
that Kriser actually knew the contents of the report. In 
support of his summary judgment motion, Kriser pro-
vided affidavit evidence that at the time of the sale he did 
not know about any soils testing that addressed the prop-
erty's suitability for housing construction and, in particu-
lar, had not seen the report. In opposition, the Andersons 
argued that Kriser's admitted knowledge of his compa-
ny's general practice of obtaining soils testing before 
development of a subdivision is evidence that he actually 
knew about the report and its contents. The Andersons 
also argued that, after the lawsuit had been filed, Kriser 
told them that he had seen the report. 
This evidence is insufficient to prevent summary 
judgment on the issue of Kriser's actual knowledge of the 
contents of the report. Even assuming that Kriser's 
knowledge of a general practice of obtaining soils testing 
raises a factual question as to whether he knew of the 
report's existence, it does not follow that [*4] Kriser 
had actual knowledge of the contents of the report. In-
deed, the Andersons asserted below-without supporting 
authority-only that Kriser's alleged knowledge of the 
existence of the report placed him on notice of its con-
tents. 2 Such a theory of knowledge will not support a 
fraudulent concealment claim. See id. ("[T]o prevail on a 
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claim of fraudulent concealment, a plaintiff must prove . 
. . that the nondisclosed information is known to the party 
failing to disclose . . .." (emphasis added)). Additionally, 
Kriser's knowledge of the report and its contents after the 
Andersons initiated this lawsuit does nothing to establish 
Kriser's knowledge at the time of the sale because the 
report was attached to the Andersons' complaint as an 
exhibit. Under these circumstances, we agree with the 
district court that the Andersons have not established a 
material question of fact as to Kriser's actual knowledge 
of collapsible soils on the property. 
2 We note that there is nothing in the record to 
suggest that a reasonable person might suspect 
that a soils report on the property would contain 
information indicating that the property was un-
suitable for residential development. To the con-
trary, [*5] Kriser's deposition testimony indi-
cates that land from which the property was ulti-
mately subdivided was surrounded by existing 
housing at the time Kriser's company purchased 
it. 
The Andersons also argue that Kriser is a build-
er-developer to whom knowledge of the collapsible soils 
was imputed as a matter of law under Yazd v. Woodside 
Homes Corp., 2006 UT 47, 143 P.3d 283. See generally 
id. PP 18-26 (imposing certain legal duties on build-
er-contractors, with resulting imputed knowledge). 
However, it is undisputed in this case that Kriser did not 
construct the Andersons' home and, thus, was not in a 
builder-contractor relationship with the Andersons under 
Yazd at the time the Andersons purchased the property. It 
is clear from Smith v. Frandsen, 2004 UT 55, 94 P. 3d 
919, that ultimate responsibility for the settling and other 
damage to the Andersons' house lies with the build-
er-contractor who actually constructed it. See id. PP 
14-27 (cutting off liability of developer to future home-
owners upon purchase of lot by builder-contractor, stat-
ing that "as a matter of law, a builder of ordinary pru-
dence would have discovered the insufficient compac-
tion"); see also Yazd, 2006 UT 47, P 21, 143 P.3d 283 
("Our reasons [*6] for [cutting off developer liability in 
Smith] had as much to do with the conclusions that we 
reached about the scope of knowledge acquired and the 
responsibility assumed by the Smiths' contractor-builder 
as with the issue of whether the developer knew of the 
poor soil conditions and whether that knowledge was 
material."). Because Kriser did not construct the Ander-
sons' home, Yazd neither imposes a duty nor imputes any 
knowledge to Kriser. Accordingly, Yazd does not require 
us to disturb the district court's summary judgment rul-
ing.3 
3 The Andersons argue for the first time in 
their reply brief that Loveland v. Orem City 
Corp., 746 P.2d 763 (Utah 1987), and Smith v. 
Frandsen, 2004 UT 55, 94 P.3d 919, impose 
upon developers "'a duty to exercise reasonable 
care to [e]nsure that the subdivided lots are suita-
ble for construction of some type of ordinary, av-
erage dwelling house,'" Smith, 2004 UT 55, P 16, 
94 P. 3d 919 (quoting Loveland, 746 P.2d at 769). 
However, arguments not raised in an appellant's 
initial brief are waived, and we do not consider 
this argument. See Allen v. Friel, 2008 UT 56, P 
8, 194 P. 3d 903 ("It is well settled that issues 
raised by an appellant in the reply brief that were 
not [*7] presented in the opening brief are con-
sidered waived and will not be considered by the 
appellate court." (internal quotation marks omit-
ted)). 
Because the Andersons have not demonstrated a 
factual dispute about Kriser's actual knowledge of the 
collapsible soils, nor have they properly raised an argu-
ment of legal imputation of such knowledge, we decline 
to disturb the district court's order entering summary 
judgment in favor of Kriser. Affirmed. 
William A. Thorne Jr., Judge 
WE CONCUR: 
Gregory K. Orme, Judge 
Carolyn B. McHugh, Judge 
